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Erwin K. Scheuch
Quantitative Analysis of Historical Material as the Basis
for a New Cooperation Between History and Sociology
I. Programmatic Cooperation Versus Quantiative Analysis
There is no shortage of programmatic Statements on systematic Cooperation be¬
tween historians and sociologists, but actual Joint work has rather been impeded by
just such programs. This is not a unique experience, as programs for interdiseiplinary
work between other disciplines often fared no better1. Interdisciplinarity as a sus-
tained activity requires certain conditions quite different from those emphasized
in many of the programmatic Statements. It is the contention of this paper that
these conditions now exist for the quantitative analysis of historical materials.
So far, the most important contributions to sociology were the work of scholars
who as individuals were able to synthesize knowledge from sociology and history.
Among the several scholars from the founding period of sociology — such as Lorenz
v. Stein, Robert v. Mohl, Gustav SchmoUer, Werner Sombart, Joseph Schumpeter—,
Max Weber Stands out as a scholar with a universal knowledge by the Standards of
his time who translated historical material into a basis for a systematic sociology .
Contrary to Weber's reeeption in the USA and from there subsequently in other
countries, his colleagues in Germany saw in him more of a social historian than of a
sociologist; von Wiese's reference to Max Weber in his short „History of Sociology"
as a promising empiricist and economic historian is representative . As the know¬
ledge of historical detail aecumulates such a synthesis as an individual accomplishment
Examples are the attempts to institutionalize interdisciplinarity between sociology and me¬
dicine, jurisprudence, and economics. Cf. Scheuch, Erwin K., Interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit
— aus der Sicht des Soziologen, in: Langenbeck's Archiv der Chirurgie, No. 337, München 1974.
Max Weber as re-imported from the United States and interpreted by Talcott Parsons is pri¬
marily the author of part of his incompleted „Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft**. Prior to this „Par-
sonification** the work considered central was his sociological analysis of world religions, Ge¬
sammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 3 vols., Tübingen 1920—1921.
3
Cf. von Wiese, Leopold, Soziologie, Geschichte und Hauptprobleme, 5th edit., Berlin 1954,
p. 129 and elsewhere. As is true for many of his contemporaries, von Wiese treated the cultural
philosopher Alfred Weber as the more prominent of the brothers.
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becomes an obvious impossibihty — safe for a selectivity and level of abstraction
from detaüs that earn such attempts the epiteton „tour de force". In such uses of
universal history as by Herbert Spencer, or Oswald Spengler, or Pitirim Sorokin his¬
torical material is not really the object of an analysis but illustration for a systema¬
tic point, characteristicaUy some form of either evolutionary or cyclical perspective
of human existence .
Actually this was the prevaÜing use made of history even earlier by some of the
founding fathers of sociology, such Georges Sorel, or Gaetano Mosca, or Vilfredo
Pareto — and certainly also Karl Marx, exceptinghis „18thof Brumaire of Louis Na¬
poleon" , This use of historical material as ülustration in the guise of „proof" con¬
tributed to the hostüity of historians against sociology, which in the tradition of
German historicism was expressed by such influential historians as Johann Gustav
Droysen or Heinrich v. Treitschke6 . In retrospect, it is specifically the use of historical
material from a single systematic viewpoint — be it the eternal circulation of elites,
or the oscillation between materialistic and indealistic orientation of cultures, or
the trend from simple to ever increasing complexity, or history as a succession of
class struggles — that makes out of „great books" very perishable produets. As
knowledge of historical detail increases these great books suffer the fate that has
been characterized for the natural sciences as the greatest tragedy in the life of a
scholar: A beautiful idea slain by a brüte fact. Courses on the history of sociology
have as their main subject matter such systematic uses of historical material by uni-
versalistically educated scholars that are now merely of historical interest,- and not
as contributions of Substantive knowledge7.
4
The most important evolutionary writer for sociology has been Spencer, Herbert, The Prin¬
ciples of Sociology, 3 vols., New York 1876-1896. A very characteristic recent example of cy¬
clical theories is Sorokin's attempt to interpret history as an oscUlation between materialistic
and spiritual orientation; Sorokin, Pitirim A., Society, Culture, and Personality, New York
1947, especiaUy Part VI.
5
The evolutionary orientation in nearly aU of Marx's works is obvious, although it is not al¬
ways recognized to which degree Marx chose his references to actual facts and events to fit his
evolutionary scheme. In some of his comments on events of his own time, however, Marx is a
historiographer — specifically in his analyses of the various uprisings in France.
6
In reaction to this the school of historicism in Germany emphasized the need to understand
each time by itself as a unique configuration. This historical approach had for a considerable
time the function of an alternative social science to sociology. Compare Droysen, Johann Gu¬
stav, Grundriß der Historik, Leipzig 1868 and von Treitschke, Heinrich, Die Gesellschaftswis¬
senschaft. Ein kritischer Versuch, Leipzig 1859.
7
An example of this are theories on the development of the family from a presumed „natu¬
ral" condition to its current form. Cases were cited to argue for the primaey ofjust one form of
the family, such as the primaey of group marriage by Friedrich Engels („Vom Ursprung der Fa¬
müie. . ."), or of the matriarchal family by Johann Jakob Bachofen, or of the patriarchal family
as argued by Edward Westermarck. As systematic Information about the past and of develop¬
ment these „great books" are useless.
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This tendency to premature high level generalization by many of the founding
fathers of sociology aside — although it is still with us and rewarded with reputa-
tion —, the synthesis as an individual accomplishment is obviously only fruitful in
the early development of a discipline. This has been no different in the Cooperation
between other disciplines that are rieh in material and conceptual apparatus. There
is no way around the need for Cooperation between scholars from different disciplines
who contribute to this Cooperation through their distinct competence, such as the
specific competence of the historian in judging documents or being able to place
them into context, or the skill of sociologists in data analysis. It is more problema-
tic to which degree and especially in which way sociologists and historians can com¬
bine their respective problem formulations and conceptual apparatus — a point to
which it will be necessary to return.
In view of this, the various programmatic Statements for Cooperation betweeen
the two disciplines are understandable — and yet they have resulted in more damage
than good if they were phrased as exclusive programs rather than as one new possi-
bÜity in addition to other programs (or paradigms, as it now has become fashion-
able to say). Examples of such exclusive programs are the demand torewrite history
as social history (at least for purposes of Instruction in secondary schools), or the
blanket demand for history to be practiced as an applied social science . Add to
this such ideological formulations as the request that history should from now on
Spotlight the downtrodden, the victims of events rather than the actors, and the call
for Cooperation between historians and sociologists becomes a political issue .
However, historians may be reminded that this politication of disciplinary issues is
not a consequence of „sociologisation" but due to amore general trend that produced
8
Compare Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (ed.), Geschichte und Soziologie, Köln 1972; Tiüy, Charles,
Clio ancl Minerva, in: McKinney, J. C, and Tiryakian, E. A. (eds.), Theoretical Sociology, New
York 1970, pp. 434—466; Hobsbawm, E. J., From Social History to the History of Society, in:
Daedalus, No. 100 (1971); Benson, L., Toward the Scientific Study of History, New York 1972.
For problems resulting from such an approach see Sherif, Mustapher and Sherif, Caroline (eds.),
Interdiseiplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences, Chicago 1969. For a more pragmatic ap¬
proach see the program of the International Association for Historical Social Research,QUAN¬
TUM (1975).
9
A very pointed advocate for a new history whose heroes would be the silent masses, a histo¬
ry that would view events from the bottom up instead of replicating the view of the „makers**
of history, is Modell, John, Die »Neue Sozialgeschichte* in Amerika, in: Geschichte und Gesell¬
schaft, Voll (1975), pp. 155 passim. One of the most influential sociologists-plus-historians,
Richard Tilly, is not free of the claim that this new history is at last real history. Cf.Tüly, Ri¬
chard, and Hohorst, Gerd, Sozialer Protest in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Jarausch,
Konrad (ed.), Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft, Düsseldorf 1976, pp. 232-278;
also TiUy, Richard, Zum Thema, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977), pp. 151-152.
The ideological use of history has invaded the class rooms of secondary education and journa-
lism. Cf. Rudolph, Hermann, Was ist Geschichte?, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 9,
1978, p. 25.
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also such sects as „revisionistic" history10. There is supreme irony in this reideolog-
ization of history and sociology alike, as it is largely based on a defunct historio¬
graphy.
The currently virulent ideologies apart, programmatic requests for Cooperation
of the type quoted above tend to block sustained work for reasons of principle. In
aü these cases a foUow-up of the programmatic request assumes that from now on a
particular perspective, a paradigm, is shared, up to and often including a common
teleology. In this day and age this may be the binding element for a sect but cannot
be the universal orientation for an empirical discipline that every so often happens
upon new knowledge.
The quantitative analysis of historical material may sometimes be advocated in a
manner that sounds like the programs referred to earlier, and yet it is a completely
different basis for Cooperation. All that is required here is an agreement on a com¬
mon material, and a common technology in data handling. From traditional points
of view in the discipline this may presuppose both Substantive and methodological
decisions that are considered alien. One may object that trivial objects of trivial
people are not the observational base for a history that reveals purposes to mankind
or is able to provide lessons to the present. As a sociologist, these arguments are
outside my proper realm of interest. The methodological argument that this quanti¬
tative history presupposes a deterministic view, however, is not; this was the central
issue in one of the great methodological controversies in sociology, namely the
historicism controversy. As is usual for such sweeping issues it did not get re-
solved but was largely forgotten — and rightly so. In order to perform quantitative
analysis a deterministic view is unnecessary; it is only necessary to expect that there
are also regularities in human existence which are not apparent to the actors them¬
selves but have to be inferred. Whether this is indeed so and what strength these
factors have relative to unique influences, is an empirical question. The experience
so far suggests that it is worthwhÜe to continue this search, and be it only as a form
of description that transcends any observers abüity. And if some sociologists argue
that with industrialization man's conditions are changed in a way that reference to
previous experience is an obstacle to what is reaUy needed, namely utopian phanta-
sy, then again this is properly an empirical issue and not a decision immune to it.
Anyway, so far the predictions of the non-utopians have been better than utopian
scenarios of the immediate future.
A central figure for the evolution of an ideologically committed history is Moore, Barring¬
ton, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston 1966. Compare also Rothman, Stan¬
ley, Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution, in: American PoUtical Science Review,
Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 61-82, and Fogel, R. W., and Engerman, S. L. (eds.), The Reinterpretation
of American Economic History, New York 1971. French ,structuralism* is another intellectual
fashion that encouraged an ideologicaUy committed history; compare Schiwy, Günter (ed.), Der
französische Strukturalismus, Reinbek 1969. A German variant of this plea for ideological com-
mittment is Schmidt, Alfred, Geschichte und Struktur, München 1971.
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Quantitative analysis of historical material provides a common empirical base for
many diverse interpretations — in this way similar to such a tool as time and money
budgets11. lt's particular contribution is the description of diversity and the detec-
tion of regularities in so far as both transcend the observational powers of con¬
temporaries — and this is a direct analogy to the most fruitful applications of quan-
titavive techniques in sociology. This empirical baseis open toa variety ofparadigms
— and emphasizing this may help to overcome some of the reservations of historians
that as yet view this trend with reservations.
For sociologists a different explanation is necessary to stimulate their attention.
There are, however, two traditions that impede the füll use of a new, vast empirical
base for their discipline.
IL On the Evolutionary Tradition in Sociology
The topic should be unnecessary as we have it on the eminent authority of Talcott
Parsons that „Herbert Spencer is dead!"12 However, Herbert Spencer under dif¬
ferent names is very much alive, indeed, and kicking for the same reasons that pro¬
duced Herbert Spencers in the first place. Fora while it seemed that Herbert Spencer
was dead, as the motivations for the evolutionary canvasses in our disciplines had
paled. Now, the interest in the course of development is high once again as the con¬
fidence in the acceptability of the future is low.
Sociology — in the form that has become professionalized — is indeed a „crisis
discipline". In the 19th Century there was a wide-spread agreement that the current
Situation, the current societal condition, could not last. This was not to be a new
form of human existence to continue but a transitory period1 . Conservative obser-
vers, such as Wilhelm Heinrich v. Riehl or Lorenz v. Stein, might emphasize the
features of dissolution that they saw at their time, and would accordingly choose
This was the perspective from which Lenin advocated the collection of time and money
budgets, namely as reflections of reality. This led to a specific version of empirical research in
countries that officially follow Leninist principles. The most representative presentation of this
research is Szalai, Alexander (ed.), The Use of Time, The Hague 1972.
12
Cf. Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, New York 1937. Later, Parsons is less
certain, as is evident in the Point of View of the Author, in: Black, Max (ed.), The Social Theo¬
ries of Talcott Parsons, Englewood Cliffs 1961, pp. 311-363.
That in spite of all the protestations about his „scientism" in charting the course of history,
Karl Marx is reaUy driven by apocalyptic vison was recognized early by Sorel, George, La de*-
composition du marxisme, Paris 1907. Rene König revived this understanding in Soziologie heu¬
te, Zürich 1949, pp. 30 passim, and he stimulated the work of Jakob Taubes, Abendländische
Eschatologie, Bern 1947.
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topics and perspective in empirical work. From a more radical perspective one might
emphasize the direction of development and opt for a teleology, which is obvious in
the works of Marx, Spencer, Comte, but also characteristic in such concepts as
Ferdinand Tönnies' „Gemeinschaft" and „Gesellschaft"14.
For sociology, the empirical basis for the construction of these teleological Sche¬
ines, answering „whither are we going?", shifted over time with material from other
disciplines being dominant then. We are now used to sociologists being their own
data gatherers but during this ,heroic" period they relied on historical material,
sometimes ethnographic material. There was a preference for historical material untü
about the 1870s, and as subsequently ambitious ethnographic reports became avail¬
able this was the preferred material. The differences between Marx and the eider
Friedrich Engels are a case in point15. To a degree both types of material were used
in the same way: one would look at the past or at „primitive" cultures as a descrip¬
tion of origins. HopefuUy, one would find a few examples of intervening condi¬
tions, and from there constructed a picture of the future.
A specific interest was the search for zero-points of human developments, those
elementary forms behind which human existence did not go back, the bases from
where human existence progressed. And if one had found the zero-base, one could
then speculate to which degree human history was in error, impeded possibilities;
not only would one be able to predict the future but to create a better one by
knowing from history not only the direction but also man's unused potential. Seen
from today it may be baffling to read the arguments about the originality either of
the nuclear family or of group-marriages, the arguments resting on exceedingly few
cases. However, this was primarily not a discussion with scholarly intentions, sine
ira et studio, but one which had immediate ideological consequences. The writer to
whom we are obliged for the very term „sociology", Auguste Comte, consequently
proceeded from an apparent concern with scholarship to the founding of an elitist
sect.
14
The apparent dichotomies prevalent in sociology early in this Century, were frequently teleo¬
logical in an extremely reduced form. This is true for Emüe Durkheim's juxtaposition of mecha-
nical vs. organic solidarity, for Ferdinand Tönnies* dichotomy „Gemeinschaft** vs. „GeseU¬
schaft", and for Charles Cooley's distinction primary vs. secondary groups. The very basic con¬
cepts of sociology until the recent past implied teleologies.
Friedrich Engels was the consumer of ethnographic material, as he was attentive to empirical
material that came into his view. However, there are significant bÜnd Spots, the most important
being an ignorance of the quantitative history aheady avaüable at that time, such as Graunt,
John, Natural and PoUtical Observations Mentioned in a Following Index and Made Upon the
BiUs of Mortality, London 1662. Neither did they pay attention to quantitative research at
their time, such as Le Play, M. F., La reforme sociale en France, Paris 1864, and Morseüi, Hen¬
ry, Suicide
— An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics, New York 1882 (Durkheim's „Suicide"
was not published untü 1897!). In addition there were many more good Statistical sources avail¬
able than were used — as is evident from Weiss, Hilda P., Les enquetes ouvrieres en France entre
1830 et 1848, Paris 1936. The social sciences — or at least the part that was handed-on to the
past as important — could have been far more empirical than they actuaUy were.
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Of course, the empirical base avaüable to social scientists of this time was extre¬
mely thin. Each time when a significant new contribution of ethnographers became
avaüable the evolutionary constructs needed to be rearranged. Equally, a single case,
the presumed conditions in an individual tribe, had a sensational impact provided
the case fitted the preconceptions of the social scientist. An example is the publica¬
tion by Henry Morgan about the Iroquois. Morgan was employed as an engineer in
buüding a raihoad to Lake Erie, and he became fascinated by the life of Indians as
he was able to record it at the end of the 19th Century; there are now some argu¬
ments that this was a non-typical Situation fot the tribe itself. Even though this was
a contribution by an amateur, it was immediately used by the evolutionists such as
Friedrich Engels, and even today the presumed case of the Iroquois as proof of the
primaey of matriarchalism was cited uneritieally by ideologists such as Ernest Bor¬
nemann,
The empirical material was in truth not an empirical base for the theory but
mere ülustration for preconceptions. Thus, when the cultural revolution of the six¬
ties erupted with the dusting off of 19th Century thought, the example of the earlier
use of the Iroquois had a contemporary paraüel. Some deservedly forgotten Student-
sociologist thought he had found an African tribe, the Amba, who lacked any strati¬
fication in power or authority. And significantly, a fully grown German university
professor, Ralf Dahrendorf, argued the case as though it would be decisive for the
question whether stratification in power is a necessary part of a developed social
structure16. Contrary to the Situation at the time of Henry Morgan and his report
on the Iroquois, there was now ample ethnological material on the stratification in
power of tribal societies, but the neo-evolutionists were not interested in this, Even
if the Amba had indeed lacked any stratification in power and authority: So what?
The use of historical material by evolutionaries and neo-evolutionaries was of the
same character. This was not reaUy an interest in history as a characterization in
each case of past conditions as they really were, and there was accordingly no im-
mersion in sources. The characteristic evolutionist was and is in search of building
blocks to fit his architectural design of human development. Contrasting the use of
ethnographic and historical material by Johann Jakob Bachofen and Edward Wester-
marck with the work of Karl Wittfogel or Max Weber exemplifies the difference
between using other disciplines for illustration rather than as providing an extension
of the empirical base for sociology.
When Backofen and Westermarck argued for one „original** form of the famüy,
then „original" was to imply „natural". Human history was then a formation of
this natural State as a deformation, until it would be possible now to regain the na¬
tural State at a higher level of civilization. The mystical theologian Bachofen cited
historical and ethnographic material, but also used legends and fairy tales, to demon¬
strate the primaey of matriarchalism; the historicaUy known forms of the family,
such as the classical Roman family (or rather what at that time was believed to have
Cf. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Amba, Amerikaner und Kommunisten — zur These der .Universalität
von Herrschaft, in: Dahrendorf, R. (ed.), Pfade aus Utopia, München 1967, pp. 315-336.
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been the Roman famüy) or the famüy ofJudaism were seen as suppression of a na¬
tural State17. ParaUels were maintained between the presumed suppression of wo¬
men in patriarchaUsm and the political Organisation of countries. Westermarck, too
attributed a paradigmatic quality to the forms of the familial distribution of autho¬
rity, although he cited historical sources for the primaey of the patriarchal family.
Even though this controversy surfaced again as part of the intellectual imitations
that were characteristic for the „cultural revolution", family sociologists generaUy
agree that searching ethnographic and historical records for a „natural" State of hu¬
man existence is futÜe. Evidence from research on primates makes it more hkely
that there was „originally" more than one form of the family. It is characteristic
for sociological evolutionism that it is clandestinely anti-historical, namely the
search for non-historical conditions and the perspective of history as deformation.
In analyzing historical material on the great river-valley civüizations, Karl Wittfo-
gel also had an ideological motivation, namely to develop a scheme for the neces¬
sary development of State sociahsm into a bureaucratic oligarchy18. The centrality
of the single source of wealth, the river water, and the need for regulation of this
resource, leads to the development of a central bureaucracy — and according to
Wittfogel it does so with inevitabüity. WittfogePs writings resemble classical evolu¬
tionism in his use of history in so far that historical instances of what Wittfolge calls
„hydraulic civüizations" are presented with the intent to demonstrate an inevitable
development, in this case the dominance of a bureaucratic class. However, Wittfogel
does attempt to work as an historian, and above aU history is treated as a normal
State of human existence instead of a transitory condition.
Our understanding of the Roman famüy is largely a reflection of the construction of ideal
types by legal historians. Even if we leave aside the question whether these legal construets had
much to do with reality — and among other indications sculptures and inscriptions on ceme-
teries suggest otherwise —, there were two legal forms for marriage among which the spouses
could choose. The patriarchal family was the marriage „cum manu**, the essence of which was
the transfer of the wife from her kin to that of her husband's, as against the marriage sine
manu which was a contract between individuals including the right to divorce for both parties.
This latter form was usual and disapproved by the Caesars — which may be the reason for histo¬
rians to be largely silent about it. Even the family of Ancient Judaism was probably not an in¬
stitution of despotic power as it appeared in official descriptions and in several spectacular cases
in the Old Testament. At the Institute of Applied Social Research of the University of Cologne
we reanalyzed the conflicts within the family that are described in the Old Testament These
descriptions were read as an indication of what they implied about the operative norms in daily
Ufe. As a result we concluded that the usual picture of PatriarchaUsm in AncientJudaism referred
primarily to the family as a religious unit, and in official transactions with the outside world
— but not in other fields of behavior. Cf. Wurmnest, Karl Friedrich, Die RoUe des Individuums
innerhalb von Familie und Ehe im Alten Testament anhand relevanter Texte unter Berücksichti¬
gung weit- und kulturgeschichtlich bedingter Raum-Zeitstrukturen, unpublished dissertation at
the Philosophische Fakultät, University of Cologne, 1978.
18
Cf. Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism, New York 1957. Wittfogel presents his mono-
graph as comparative research with total societies as a unit.
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We mentioned already that to his German contemporaries, Max Weber was rather
an economic historian than the theorist of the first part of Economy and So¬
ciety19 . At the beginning of his career, German economic historians were analyzing
their material in order to show necessary „stages" in the development of civüi¬
zations, and to demonstrate a close relationship between an economic and a social
order. This was a far cry from the evolutionism of Auguste Comte or Herbert Spen¬
cer who maintained a continuity of evolution from simple inanimated conditions to
the complexity of society, an evolution that presumably was inevitable, monodirec-
tional and monocausal. Yet Weber differed from those contemporary economic
historians stül further into the direction of an historian strictu sensu. In the central
part of his work, the volumes on the sociology of religion, Weber deliberately varies
civüizations in order to refute monocausal notions about the relation between
„base" (economy) and „superstructure" (religion): Each of these civüizations has
to be understood via its own „Sinn" (approximately „meaning"), has a „Gestalt"
(approximately „shape") of its own20. Yet Weber was also a sociologist using con¬
cepts without specific time-space meanings, and in this context he was a modified
evolutionist. Weber's writings onmusic,on authority (an unfortunate translation of
his „Herrschaft"), on science, and on bureaucracy aü have one „Leitmotiv": Why
did a specific type of rationality develop only in Europe?21 In pursuing these two
main lines of work — their relation cannot be discussed here — Weber did not work
with the conclusions of historians but with the source material itself.
19
In the American reception of Max Weber the conditions under which Weber approached his
monumental Economy and Society are largely forgotten. It is no longer possible to reconstruct
a definitive version of this posthumous work, as it is likely that Weber changed his original
notions several time as the work progressed. Economy and Society was to be in a way a con¬
trast to his work so far as it was to present his concepts in a systematic way. This proved to be
more difficult than expected as indeed the concepts were developed at different times in re¬
sponse to different tasks. Thus, it is simply not possible to estabhsh a systematic relation be¬
tween the taxonomies for forms of legitimate authority („reine Typen der Herrschaft**) and the
taxonomy for types of action orientation („Typen des Handelns**), without creating confusion —
as is indeed sometimes the case in Economy and Society. Cf. Scheuch, Erwin K., and Kutsch,
Thomas, Grundbegriffe der Soziologie, 2nd edit., Stuttgart 1975, Chapter 9, Sections 1 and
2. For a new way to look at Economy and Society see Tenbruck, Friedrich H., Abschied von
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in: Staatswissenschaft, Tübingen 1978, pp. 1—34.
The notion of „Sinn** is central for Weber's analysis of a total system: its the attribution of
»Leitmotivs* to the actions in a society. Cf. Girndt, Helmut, Das soziale Handeln als Grundkate¬
gorie erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Soziologie, Tübingen 1967.
The notion of „rationality** as a »Leitmotiv* of Systems is explored in Münch, Richard, Max
Webers »Anatomie des okzidentalen Rationalismus* — eine systemtheoretische Lektüre, in: So¬
ziale Welt, 29 (1978), pp. 217-246. There are two more sides to Weber's work, the second
of which is largely unknown today. It is better known that Weber was interested in methodolo¬
gical issues, as is evident e. g. in Weber, Max, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt 1968 (a col¬
lection), but he was also a passionate commentator on political developments. Cf. Weber, Max,
Gesammelte poütische Schriften, 2nd edit., Tübingen 1958.
33
Even the second accent of Weber's work could not be replicated today. There
may be a revival of evolutionism in intellectual life, but only in the sense of a philo-
sophical exploitation of historical generalizations and not in the sense of a use of
historical sources to construct laws of development. None of the grand conclusions
of the evolutionists stood the test of time, and it is unlikely that the neo-evolutionists
wül fare better. There is now such a wealth of empirical evidence, and the move¬
ment of quantitative history increases the volume stül further, that a simple order-
ing whether in „stages of development" or in cycies is no longer feasible. The publi¬
cations of Shmuel Eisenstadt demonstrate that historiography and social science
can still be combined in the grand style, but the accent is on comparativism and de-
finitely not on evolution
2
. A sociology that hopes to regain the courage to sweeping
theories of the 19th Century, a sociology that looks upon history as an opportunity
to revive evolutionism, misses the specific usefulness of the current meeting of so¬
ciology and history. The description of everyday life and mass events in the past
that now becomes possible, definitely does not lend itself to a type of theoretizing
in the evolutionary tradition. Although at first sight the assertion may seem para-
doxical, it nevertheless can be argued that structural-functional theoretizing is more
compatible with the data from quantitative history.
III. Is Functionalism Necessary Anti-Historical?
This is only in part a rhetorical question, as there is no unequivocal answer: there is
no necessary conflict between a structural-functional kind of theoretizing and his¬
tory, but in practice this is so. This is probably due to the development of structural-
functionalism in the United States. Be that as it may, structural-functionalism has
been so dominant a mode of theoretizing since the middle forties until the middle
sixties that it became synonimous with general sociological theory. In practice, this
kind of theory prided itself in formulating general sentences without time-space
referents, was general theory in line with the introductory part of Weber's Economy
and Society and not with his other writing. It was usual amongst sociologists to un¬
derstand this mode of formulating as following the example of the successful na¬
tural sciences — and that meant largely physics.
This is, however, a misunderstanding. The discipline in the natural sciences dos¬
est to structural-functionalism in sociology is, at least in the case of Parsons, rather
biology. Biology, that is a discipline which has to do with reactive Systems, and in
A good introduction to his approach is Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed.), The Decline of Empires,
Englewood Cliffs 1967. Much more ambitious is Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed.), Political Sociology,
New York 1971, which in spite of its title is predominantly a book with historical comparisons,
albeit of an non-quantitative character.
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this sense it is contrary to some of the classical sciences Here, the object is not „cause"
and „effect" but „effect and counter-effect" At any given time, an object or pro
cess may serve more than one function, or the same object or process may serve dif
ferent functions at different times A biological orgamsm as an object of explana¬
tion is a vastly more comphcated thing then the inanimate nature Society as well,
if structural-functionahsm is properly practiced, is treated as a reactive system and
not in an analogy to inanimate nature
This would be comphcated enough, but in addition there is an unnecessary prob¬
lem in the functionalism as it is actually practiced It becomes most apparent in
what is calied „Systems Analysis" In this approach it is assumed or implied that ba
sically all parts of a system are necessarily cooperating and that they react tightly to
gether This is completely unnecessary to assume smce there are parts m the body
too, which are unnecessary, not everything is directed to the same purpose There are
countervailmg processes, functional Substitutes in addition to fixed organs, and a
lot of give and-take, 1 e looseness between organs and parts of a body However,
Systems theory as a specific form of structural functionalism in its actual practice
assumed a direct reaction of all parts of a system to each other2
The conceptual apparatus, the research problems and the empincal research con
nected with these approaches found its purest expression in small group research2 In
deed, small group research has as an object something that does not really exist but
is constituted as an construct — and yet this research was to a degree successful in
finding universals that eluded sociologists in many other areas Yes, sociology has de¬
veloped universal sentences about human behavior that can be applied in a variety
of contexts This copy ofphysics was not a story of complete faüure, unfortunately
it is also not a SLory of a large scale success As sociologists moved beyond the
micro level it became much harder to justify time space free sentences m terms of
,,X" being a function of ,,Y" What stood sociologists in good stead, namely the
type of conceptual apparatus, the type of methodology and specifically the type of
Interpretation when they worked with the immediately observable, was much less
successful when they had to work with indicators and the proof had to be inferen
tial Most macro phenomena are of an mferential nature This became even more
important and more obvious when cross cultural research became important
23
The most prominent representative of this kind of Systems theory in Germany is today Nik
las Luhmann, cf Luhmann, Niklas (ed ), Soziologische Aufklarung —Aufsatze zur Theone sozia
ler Systeme, Opladen 1970, also Zweckbegnff und Systemrationahtat, Tubingen 1968, also Zur
systemtheoretischen Konstruktion von Evolution, in Lepsius, Rainer (ed ), Zwischenbilanz der
Soziologie, Stuttgart 1976, pp 37—48, also Generalized Media and the Problem of Contingen
cy, in Loubser, Jan J , et al (eds ), Explorations in General Theory in the Social Sciences, New
York 1974
24
A recent overview of the whole field is Schneider, H D , Kleingruppenforschung, Stuttgart
1975. For the seif understanding of this approach see Bales, Robert Fred, Personality and Inter
personal Behavior, New York 1970 The artificial character ofthe whole field is cntized by So
rokin, Pitirim A., Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences, Chicago 1956
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As structural functionalism has been a part-success, as there are areas which can
be shown as modeis to other disciplines, as the methodology works very fine, this
partial success tends to somewhat impede the openness in turning to such a vast new
area of material as becomes avaüable to us in quantitative history. EspeciaUy, the
part-success tends to inhibit a re-examination whether structural-functionalism
needs to be practiced in the way that prevaüed up to now.
IV. Empirical Sociology Experiences Limits
At the end of a period of more than thirty years of development in empirical socio¬
logy, there is now some soual searching and attempts at stock taking25 . This was in
many ways a most successful period: in some fields general „laws" akin to those of
physics were identified; the methodology for the social sciences in general was
furthered and became an export articie even to those who voiced programmatic
reservations against „positivistic" sociology; and a vast amount of descriptive know¬
ledge was accumulated. Methodology and social description could be so standardised
that they could be the base for a service industry that now produces vast quantities
of facts. Increasingly, social scientists begin to tap the additional vast data resources
that come into being as a side-product of public and private bureaucracies26. Now
that we are relatively data rieh, we begin to feel just as those rieh in other proper-
25
Examples of this seif doubt, coupled with the desire to retain the claim to be at the same
time a science and a tool of the Enüghtment are Birnbaum, Norman, The Crisis of Industrial So¬
ciety, London 1969; Gouldner, Alvin W., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York
1970; Dahrendorf, Ralf, Die Soziologie und der Soziologe, in: Hess, Gerhard (ed.), Konstanzer
Universitätsreden, no year. It is instruetive to compare these diagnoses with the actual work
presented at the 17th German „Soziologentag** in 1974, presumably a crisis year if judged by
public appearences: During the sociological Convention routinized science (in the sense of Th.
Kuhn) prevaüed. See Lepsius, Zwischenbilanz. See also Scheuch, Erwin K., Die wechselnde Da¬
tenbasis der Soziologie. Zur Interaktion zwischen Theorie und Empirie, in: MüUerjPaul J. (ed.),
Die Analyse prozeß-produzierter Daten, Stuttgart 1977^ pp. 5—41.
An over-all view of this vast area is Wilcox, Lesly D., et al. (eds.), Social Indicators and So¬
cietal Monitoring, Amsterdam 19 72.So far social scientists use only fractions of the material exist¬
ing, as can be inferred from Statistisches Bundesamt, Das Arbeitsgebiet der BundesStatistik
1976, Stuttgart 1976. Currently, the chief interest in using these process-produced or officiaUy
coUected data is their appropriateness for societal monitoring, as explained in Zapf, Wolfgang
(ed.), Sozialberichterstattung — Möglichkeiten und Probleme, Göttingen 1976. See also Krupp,
Hans-Jürgen, and Zapf, Wolfgang, Sozialpolitik und Sozialberichterstattung, Frankfurt 1977,
for a characterization of the most important research unit in this field in Germany, SPES: Zapf,
Wolfgang (ed.), Soziale Indikatoren, 3 vols., Frankfurt 1974—1975. This field is internatio-
nalizing fast, as can be derived from international data coUections such as EUROSTAT: Social
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ties presumably do: it is great to be rieh but it satisfies a lot less than expected.
Many of the facts and figures are suspected to be less informative than we thought
at a time when each new fact or figure possessed a novelty value.
To give one example of considerable personal importance. During the fifties it
was empiricaUy demonstrated again and again that one large difference between
mass opinion in Europe and in the United States was what political scientists con-
ceptualized as „system trust". Europeans were shown to be highly seeptical about
their politicians, their political parties, and sometimes also of all of the political
system. In contrast, respondents in the United States expressed an unshakable re¬
spect for the office of the president and the institution of the two-party-system,
even when they detested a particular president or found their two political parties
at a given time to be in terrible shape. Just as they were reputedly cynical about
morals, these Europeans were calied political cynics, and American political scien¬
tists concluded that this was not a condition in which a meaningful democracy
could florish. Now that we count the year five post-Watergate the trust of Americans
in their political institutions is below that which opinion researchers now report for
European countries27. What did we measure some thirty years ago: Was it reaüy an as¬
pect of a distinct political structure, or merely a mood? And do changes in mood
matter very much in the Operation of a political system?28
In looking back at over thirty years of data collection we can observe both high
stabüity of differences between countries and groups within a country for some
subject matter, and great changes up to ficklishness of figures in other areas. In the
field of leisure we have witnessed a high instability of behavior, and this is currently
especially true in research on tourism . Research on sexual matters has shown a
tremendous instabüity in beliefs and opinions, and far more stability than instability
in behavior. Currently, there is in Germany a debate whether we witness a major
change in values amongst youth — the school of „post industrialism" believes that
this is so —, and whether the traditional work ethic is faUing apart; it is by no means
clear what the figures really do indicate. Where do we measure a structural proper¬
ty, where do we record a mere transitional State? Sociologists are becoming — albeit
a bit too slow — more careful in interpreting numbers.
Indicators for the European Community, Luxemburg 1977; and there is also now an interna¬
tional newssheet: Social Indicators Newsletter, Social Science Research CouncÜ, New York.
While much of this work is pure induetion, there are attempts to develop a rationale as in Fox,
Karl A., Social Indicators and Social Theory, New York 1974; OECD, Measuring Social Well-
Being, Paris 1976. Decisive for the expansion of basic research using these resources wiU be the
development of an appropriate infrastructure of data Services, as reported by Rokkan, Stein,
Data Services in Western Europe — Reflections on Variations in the Conditions of Academic In¬
stitution-Building, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 19 (1976), pp. 443—454.
27
Cf. Huntington, Samuel, et al., The Crisis of Western Democracy, New York 1976.
Critical of the literature on the loss of governability is Scheuch, Erwin K., Wird die Bundes¬
republik unregierbar?, AGV MetäU, Köln 1976.
See Scheuch, Erwin K., and Scherhorn, Gerhard, Soziologie der Freizeit und des Konsums,
in: König, Rene (ed.), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol. 11, Stuttgart 1977.
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Empiricism was quite successful in providing a basis for micro sociology. Macro so¬
ciology, however, did not progress in the way it was hoped. In Germany it was espe¬
cially a group of sociologists sometimes calied by others the „Cologne School" that
had advocated cross-level analysis and corresponding data collection as the method¬
ology appropriate for macro sociology . However, the pay-off of this theoretically
sound notion has been far less than hoped for31. Whether this is due to the empiri¬
cal research, or the conceptualization of it, or the far greater complexity of an
empiricaUy founded macro sociology is an open question.
Research tools are proliferating at a very rapid rate. Techniques that were known
for a long time but little used, such as comphcated sampling techniques for sub-
groups of large populations, or techniques of content analysis — are now being actual¬
ly used. The machinery of large scale electronic data processing is important in
turning esoteric knowledge into practical procedures. There are many original ideas
in developing so-caüed unobtrusive techniques i. e. highly inferential measures inde¬
pendent of verbal Statements . And in general, there is a greater wülingness to
combine measurements from several sources: Sociologists may become as critical of
their data as historians reputedly are of their sources. On the other hand with the
explosive growth of analysis opportunities there has been a tendency to overanalyze
some data. The debate about weak versus strong measurement indicates that there
has been an unthinking preference for the most powerful Statistical techniques re¬
gardless of the level of measurement and the reliability of a figure . The latter is a
tendency that quantitative historians should better watch.
An overview is given in H. J. Hummel, an adherent of the „Cologne School**, Probleme der
Mehrebenen Analyse, Stuttgart 1972. A very optimistic expectation was formulated during the
sixteenth German „Soziologentag** in Frankfurt 1968 by Scheuch, Erwin K., Methodische Pro¬
bleme gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analysen, in: Adorno, Theodor W. (edL), Spätkapitalismus oder
Industriegesellschaft?, Stuttgart 1969, pp. 153-182.
Massive secondary analysis of data on voting behavior by Franz U. Pappi found in the end
that including contextual variables added very little to the explanatory power of the routine in¬
dividual variables; cf. Pappi, Franz Urban, Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte in der Bun¬
desrepubUk. Individual- und Kontextanalysen der Wahlenentscheidung (in publication).
The „classical** source on unobtrusive techniques is Web6, Eugene, et al., Unobtrusive Mea¬
sures, Chicago 1966. A prerequisite for the large scale use of quantitative content analysis is
their combination with sampling techniques; see Kops, Manfred, Auswahlverfahren in der In¬
haltsanalyse, Meisenheim a. G. 1977. Important contributions to methodology that are espe¬
ciaUy useful for quantifying and analyzing historical material are Steinhausen, Detlef, and Lan¬
ger, Klaus, Clusteranalyse, Berlin 1977, and Sodeur, Wolfgang, Empirische Verfahren zur Klas¬
sifikation, Stuttgart 1974. An overview of research techniques that includes advanced methods
relevant to quantitative history yet accessible to the non-specialist in methodology is van Kool-
wijk, Jürgen, and Wieken-Mayser, Maria (eds.), Techniken der empirischen Sozialforschung,
vols. 2-7, München 1974-1977.
For the debate on the level of measurement appropriate to the data see Scheuch, Erwin K.,
Forschungstechniken als Teil der Soziologie heute, in: Lepsius, ZwischenbUanz, especially pp.
94 passim. Compare also Acock, Alan C, and Martin, David, The Undermeasurement Contro¬
versy, in: Sociology and Social Research, 58 (1974), pp. 427 passim.
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There is now some better understanding of what John Stuart MÜ1 meant when
he argued that the social sciences were „observational", and why Emile Durkheim
was anti-experimental. One does not have to reject the experiment as a tool of re¬
search in order to sympathize with the notions about the character of social Systems
that lead to the anti-experimentalism of Mills and Durkheim. Many social pheno¬
mena have meaning depending on contexts, are interconnected and multifunctional.
Even elementary activities such as eating or sexual intercourse carry several mean¬
ings! Social processes are both over- and underdetermined. Relating single variables
to each other does usually not do justice to the structure of social phenomena, and
with the realization of this condition, analysis techniques are being developed that
are more appropriate to the interconnectedness and multidimensionality of social
phenomena. Path analysis, causal analysis and LISREL are examples for this trend34.
It is doubtful that the limits in explanation which empirical sociologists now
sometimes encounter can be overcome solely by further analysis techniques, and a
more systematic combination of data. For many problems longer periods of Obser¬
vation are required, and an extension of conditions under which behavior is observed.
Quantitative history can provide this extension of the data base for sociology — not
so much in quantity but more importantiy in quality. In turn, the response of so¬
ciology to the multicollineality of relations between variables, the reaction to the
multidimensionality of social phenomena, means that today sociologists can offer
much more adequate techniques of data handling than would have been possible
only ten years ago.
The recent meeting of historians with sociologists, in Germany connected with such
names as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Hans Mommsen, has not necessarily been the
most helpful experience . These historians hoped to borrow concepts and generali¬
zations from sociology to regain a larger scope for the discipline of history that ap¬
peared to be bogged down into historiographic details. This was an inopportune
time to do so, leaving aside the question whether there was ever an opportune time
for this.
It was a time when many of us realized that our concepts were more time-and-
space-bound than we had so far suspected. For some sociologists it was also a time
for a „paradigm change" — away from Systems analysis with its harmonistic view of
biology. We now understand biology in a very different way, namely as the discipline
of imperfectly constructed beings, as of organisms that side-by-side are characterized
by surplusses and deficiencies. Real social Systems are evidently imperfectly integra-
34
Cf. Ziegler, Rolf,Theorie und Modell, München 1972; also Blalock, Hubert M., Causal Infe-
rences in Nonexperimental Research, Chapel Hill 1964; also Weede, Erich, Hypothesen, Glei¬
chungen und Daten, Kronberg Ts. 1977.
As a source for this approach that could be calied the sociologization of history instead of
the shared use of historical data, consult Wehler, Geschichte und Soziologie. By now there are
side-by-side several forms of Cooperation between sociology and history, as is evident from the
ränge of contributions in Ludz, Peter Christian (ed.), Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte, Special
issue No. 16, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1972) — especiaUy the
introduction by the editor.
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ted, and by now it is no longer very easy to say what the boundary of the Systems
is
that we are analyzing. We cannot simply use national boundaries as being also Sys¬
tem boundaries, as the nation State is Coming apart as the highest level of integra¬
tion. Devolution within nation states and international connectedness make the
nation State level just one of several levels that indicated system boundaries. This
is
an inteüectually richer and more flexible sociology, but it is certainly not one from
which one could easüy borrow ready concepts and generalizations.
V. Quantitative Analysis of Historical Material
as an Extension of Comparativism
A more fruitful orientation in seeking a Cooperation between sociology and history
is Cooperation in exploiting a new data base. Time budget research offers an example
for the character of such a research. The use of time is a social indicator lending it¬
self to several interpretations, an indicator that can be put to many uses36. In some
of the socialist countries, time budget data are employed for such engineering pur¬
poses as the calculation of waste times, whüe the very same data are used by
Western social scientists to identify the networks of daüy intercourse. Many of the
data of quantitative history have the same indeterminate character as time budgets
have. Viewed methodologically, most analyses of quantitative history have the char¬
acter rather of secondary analysis than of primary analysis37. This may often cause
problems in Interpretation, but it does also facüitate Cooperation between scholars
from different disciplines and with different approaches: They do not need to agree
on problem formulations, or concepts. Thus, in looking at quantitative history as an
opportunity for secondary analyses of vast quantities of data about previously inac-
cessible topics and subjects, the pitfalls of the above mentioned approach — the
Wehler-Mommsen problem — is avoided.
It is dangerous when sociologists by themselves quantify and analyze historical
data, as they usually lack the famüiarity with the contexts of these data; and it is
no less hazardous if historians feel confident to order high powered statistics from
the now easy-to-use packages. But Cooperation between sociologists and historians
properly goes beyond such a symbiosis in research technology. Historians rightfully
expect that quantitative history will give new impetus to history as a generahzing
36
Cf. Szalai, The Use of Time.
„Secondary" does not imply „second class** but denotes a use of data different from the in¬
tentions with which the data were coUected. The classical source on the methodological issues
in secondary analysis is Hyman, Herbert, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys — Principles,
Procedures, and Potentialities, New York 1972.
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discipline, and sociologists hope for a vast extension of their empirical base. In this
latter sense the use of historical data is a form of comparativism, is Observation un¬
der varying conditions in the sense that John Stuart Mills argued for „observa¬
tional" social sciences. This form of comparativism complements and extends signi¬
ficantly what currently is being done in comparative social research.
One of the important resources for sociological comparativism has always been
— earlier more so than during the last decades — ethnology, and here a development
analogous to that now in quantitative history occured much earlier. A group of eth-
nologists around John Peter Murdock from Yale translated the ethnographic reports
of their time into a common scheme38. This meant among other things that check-
lists had to be developed for institutions and fields of behavior as a prerequisite for
the coding of ethnographic descriptions. Methodologically, this implied the transla¬
tion of descriptive accounts into configurations of variables. Only through this
„translation" becomes it possible to develop a quantitative ethnology on a world
scale as though the descriptive accounts had been questionnaires about cultures:
Frequencies are identified, correlations are computed, factor analyses are meant to
show hidden communalities. By now the „Human Relations Area Füe" (HRAF) is
in part machine readable, and avaüable in several countries. While this increases its
accessibility, and makes comparative ethnography something every graduate Stu¬
dent can practice, the decisive step was not the machinery but the „translation** of
the narratives. The Organization of data sets from projects in quantitative history
could do the same for historical data39.
It would be of considerable greater consequence. The Human Relations Area
File has data from more than 500 cultures, and while there are greater variations
between, the hundreds of simpler cultures, they remain simple cultures that are of
limited relevance for the understanding of a complex modern society. Even though
the volume of quantitative history has been limited, at least as compared to quantita¬
tive ethnology, its impact for social science has been far greater40. The conditions
38
Cf. Murdock, George Peter, Social Structure, New York 1949; also World Ethnographic
Sample, in: Moore, F. W. (ed.), Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology, New Haven 1961.
A survey in Germany showed that in 1977 there were more than two hundred machine read¬
able data sets with quantified historical information; compare Bick, Wolfgang, et al., Quantitative
historische Forschung 1977, Stuttgart 1977. (= Historisch Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen,
Vol. 1). See also in the same series which is issued in Cooperation with the International Associa¬
tion for Historical Social Research, QUANTUM: Best, Heinrich, und Mann, Reinhard (eds.),
Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Stuttgart 1977,
and MüUer, Die Analyse prozeß-produzierter Daten.
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The development has gone furthest in the United States, and the best source to foUow is
the Journal Historical Methods Newsletter, between 1968 and 1977 ten volumes. An example is
Volume 9, Nos. 2 and 3 on one of the massive cases of quantitative history, the Philadel¬
phia Social History Project. There is a very long tradition of a social science orientation with at¬
tention to quantitative data in France, the school of the Annaies; cf. Iggers, Georg, Die ,Anna¬
les* und ihre Kritiker, in: Historische Zeitschrift, 219 (1974), pp. 579-608. The most direct
impact on sociologists in English and German speaking countries can be attributed to the works
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and the impact of social differentation can only be studied by looking at other
complex civilizations. It is indeed quite necessary to use historical complex civüiza¬
tions for purposes of comparison in order to avoid a tendency in sociology to argue
post hoc propter hoc. Bureaucracies, corporate associations, formalization of pro¬
cedures are part of our daily live — but does that make them distinctive features of
industrial societies? There is no other way to establish what is unique about industrial
civüizations, and what is a feature of many complex societies, than to engage in
historical comparisons. In this perspective the quantitative analysis of conditions
during the Roman Empire at the time of the principat may contribute more to our
understanding of contemporary industrial societies than yet another survey.
An example may help. In working on the sociology of vacations and tourism it is
usual to assume that long-distance travel, weekend excursions, and the desertion of
cities during the holiday season are phenomena unique to the very different indu¬
strial societies . However, weekend traffic problems were part of life in the rieher
Greek cities, holidy desertion of cities was common amongst the bourgeoisie of clas¬
sical Rome, and long distance travel institutionalized in several high civilizations
such as Sumer, Persia, and Moghul India42. Several high civilizations even developed
some infrastructure for travel, such as the road networks of ancient China or Per¬
sia or Rome, complete with a system of aecomodations. However, at least one phe¬
nomenon appears to be unique to a modern civilization, namely the regulär travel
for pleasure only, while other travel such as the „Bildungsreise" have been developed
in other high civilizations.
Economic historians now inform us that production for markets is nothing
unique to our industrial civilization , nor is occupational specialization nor are ele-
tion campaigns . However, the differentiating out of economic activities appears
to be a feature of our industrial societies, are a characteristic that to someone from
a non-Western society gives our civilization a commercial flavor. In most cultures
economic matters are subservient to political considerations, and political power is
deemed a central goal and not economic weU being. And in all other cultures econo-
of the brothers Tilly; Tilly, Charles, et al., The Rebellious Centrury 1880-1930, Cambridge/
Mass. 1975; Shorter, Edward, andTUly, Charles, Strikes in France 1830-1968, Cambridge/Eng¬
land 1974; Tilly, Charles, The Vendee, Cambridge/Mass. 1964; Tilly, Richard, Populär Dis¬
orders in Nineteenth Century Germany, in: Journal of Social History, 4 (1970). In Europe,
Stein Rokkan in his many publications on nation-building has done more than any other indi¬
vidual scholar to further quantification of historical material for sociological analyses. An over¬
view of the breadth of this development can be found in Flora, Peter, Quantitative Historical
Sociology, in: Current Sociology, 23, No. 2 (1975).
This is maintained e. g. in Scheuch, Erwin K., and Meyersohn, Rolf (eds.), Soziologie der
Freizeit, Köln 1972, pp. 304—317. Some years later this opinion is revised in Scheuch and
Scherhorn, Soziologie der Freizeit und des Konsums, pp. 115—147.
Many details can be found in Casson, Lionel, Reisen in der alten Welt, London 1974.
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For Germany, urban history is the chief corrective for the previous inclination to mistake
ideals for reality. See Kellenbenz, Hermann (ed.), Zwei Jahrtausende Kölner Wirtschaft, 2 vols.,
Köln 1975.
44 *.
Cf. Etienne, Robert, La vie quotidienne a Pompei, Book no. 2, Chapter 2, Paris 1966.
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mic relations between people who know each other are subservient to requirements
and considerations of the social fabric45. Beyond economics, it may be possible that
the generally distinguishing character of Western industrial societies is the sectorial
rationality, the differentiating out of sector after sector from diffuse and multifunc-
tional roles46.
However, such a Statement may not last long in view of the many surprising find¬
ings of the history of our early industrial periods. Now we learn that not even early
capitalism lived up to its reputation of mindless exploitation of helpless proletarians.
Undoubtedly this occurred in the large industrial agglomerations, but in production
and in living conditions on a smaüer scale the employers cared not only for profit
but also for their local reputation as human beings47. In addition to the comparison
with other high civUization, the quantification of European data both of the late
medieval period and of early industrialization are likely to be important contribu¬
tions to our understanding of the distinguishing features of modern industrial socie¬
ties.
This does not mean to just wait for the conclusions of historians, this requires
data to be handled in ways that are usual in sociology, and for problem formula¬
tions that are sociological. This should be evident for what we believe to be charac¬
teristic for modern civilizations of the Western variety, namely the prevalence of
sectorial rationality. It was already mentioned that in other civilizations our econo¬
mic rationality is practiced in exchanges with Outsiders, and this behavior is consid¬
ered unfriendly. However, even with Western industrial societies there are limits to
the extension of a specific economic rationality: We do not accept economic ratio¬
nality between spouses, and between parents and children. For us, a reaUy func¬
tioning family is based on communist sentiments, namely to each according to his
needs and from each according to his abihties. In some areas such as sports, there is
both sectorial rationality and diffuse Standards, distinguishing the professional with
a specific sectorial rationality from the amateur for whom sports has a diffuse
meaning. Good research with the intention to specify sectorial rationalities requires
the manipulation of historical material such as diaries or personal letters, looking
for indications of value conflicts and for justifications of behavior. There is little
hope that a historian would systematicaUy look for indications of such aspects of
behavior that are not part of the problem understanding of his discipline or of people
themselves. In this sense there are many problems where sociologists cannot be con¬
sumers of conclusions from quantitative history but have to reexaminate quantified
historical material.
45
This is a central theme in the research of Raymond Firth about the tribal cultures in the
South Pacific, Elements of Social Organization, London 1951.
This is the central notion in Scheuch, Erwin, K., The Relationship of Government and Busi¬
ness to the Individual in Democratic and Totalitarian Systems, in: International Conference on
the Unity of Science, Vol. 4, International Cultural Foundation, New York 1978.
See Stearns, Peter N., Die Herausbildung einer sozialen Gesinnung im Frühindustrialismus —
ein Vergleich der Auffassungen französischer, britischer und deutscher Unternehmer, in: Ludz,
Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte, pp. 320—342.
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VI. The Importance of Descriptive Knowledge
However, quantitative history is of tremendous importance to sociologists in so far
as it is an extension and more often a correction of social history. Students are stül
being tested by asking them to explain the lot de contraction by EmÜe Durkheim,
and yet quantitative historical research shows that in aU likelihood this loi de con¬
traction is simply in error, is repeating what were the erroneous perceptions of
eloquent contemporaries48. Provided we would hand on to our successors as the
condition of public safety what our newspapers write, this would amount to a mas¬
sive handing-on of misinformation; provided we were to hand on what magazines
write about family life today, our successors would be better of without that infor¬
mation. However, many, many of the Statements about daily life in the past are
based on reports that are no more reliable than newspaper reports or the impression
of contemporary intellectual gurus about our own industrial societies. Even if the
guru or newspaper were correct about a condition or a change, they would be in-
competent to characterize the diversity existing at this time and earning our socie¬
ties the label „pluralistic Systems". Now that some preliterate cultures have been
studied by more than one ethnologists we understand that even those relatively
simple cultures have diversity, and that past ethnography reduced that diversity to
an ideal type. It is reasonable that in historical societies there was no less diversity,
that differences between actual behavior and official norms were common-place,
and that an informal system paralleled official structure much as this is the case for
our societies. Most social history is simply hopeless in these respects, and the only
hope is the systematic analysis of large quantities of evidences of daüy life in the
past.
Was the exploitation of colonies a major cause for the economic development of
France, or Germany? Was the French revolution caused by an intolerable pauperiza-
tion of ordinary people? Was the middle of the 19th Century in Germany a time
when in economic controversies capitalists stood against labor? By now we know
through quantitative history that the answer to all three questions is „no"49 — and
This is the conclusion of a number of quantitative studies in urban history, such as Hubbard,
WiUiam H., Der Wachstumsprozeß in den österreichischen Gross-Städten 1868—1910, in: Köl¬
ner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special issue 16, pp. 386—418, and
Forschungen zu städtischer Haushaltsstruktur am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts
— Das GRAZ-
HAUS-Prqjekt, in*. Conze, Werner (ed.), Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas,
Stuttgart 1977, pp. 283-291. Compare also Thernstrom, St., The Other Bostonians, Cambridge/
Mass. 1976; Katz, M. B., The People of Hamilton, Canada West, Cambridge/Mass. 1975.
For question no. 1 see Hochheimer, Albert, Abschied von den Kolonien, Zürich 1972; for
question no. 2 compare TUly, Charles, Vendee; for question no. 3 see Best, Heinrich, Interessen-
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that is by no means unimportant for sociology. It will become even more evident to
which degree we have based sociological Statements on a social history that is
becoming defunct.
For this author descriptive knowledge about the economy of the Roman Empire
as it was furthered especiaUy by historians in Oxford and in Princeton, became of
great importance. My understanding of Rome was very much colored by the Ger¬
man historical tradition which concentrates on the turmoil period of the Roman
Republic, and in the tradition of Theodor Mommsen understands this period as the
corruption of republican ideals — which I now see as a perspective that is very much
beside the point. By way of contrast British economic history has always emphasized
the empire during its successful time — which after all is several hundred years. Dur¬
ing this time the economic order was a variant, from a partial market economy to
the centralized State socialism of Diocletian. During the whole time of the Roman
Empire, the governments were unable to eure inflation and to establish a sound cur¬
rency for any extended period — which, by the way, the Chinese Empire faüed to
do as well. Whether detailed regulations or market mechanisms: Nothing reaUy
worked.
And yet the Roman Empire faüed to decay, while undoubtedly our Systems
would be mortally threatened if there would be inflation on the Roman scale over
many decades. Being raised on Parsons I had believed that when interchanges are
seriously upset there will be countervaüing processes untü the disturbances are cor-
rected; the Roman Empire demonstrates that social Systems can live with unsolved
problems on a massive scale — provided there are redeeming features. In the case of
the Roman Empire its Performance as a political and legal order was obviously so
impressive in comparison to other contemporary Systems that the „Roman Way of
Life" was as successful an export articie as the American Way of Life was after
World War IL
Perhaps this is a general feature of highly differentiated societies: that they have
„central problems** but are at the same time able to live with them via redeeming
features. More descriptive knowledge would help in translating this stül very vague
notion into a researchable question. However vague this notion, the descriptive ma¬
terial was already sufficient to correct the conventional wisdom in American socio¬
logy. Perhaps there will be reports based on quantitiative history about other ad¬
vanced civilizations that lasted hundreds of years without solving some central
problem; perhaps these reports will inform us what the character of countervaüing
forces was.
It is especiaUy quantitative history as the rewriting of conventional historio¬
graphy, and as the extension of knowledge about forgotten eras that will have an
important impact on sociology. One last example: We can expect important insights
into the change of Systems when the fifth Century in Western Europe is being
poütik und nationale Integration 1848/49 — Handelspoütische Konflikte im frühindustrieUen
Deutschland, Göttingen 1980.
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analyzed. The notion of a Roman empire being overrun by screaming Barbarian
hords bent on destruction is stark nonsense; Roman power did not coUapse or was
broken — it simply seeped away50. It is a story of desintegration and not of forceful
destruction.
This is an exciting time both for historians and for social scientists. There is
more than one way in which the discipline will benefit from the renewed encoun¬
ter. Programmatic debates will have little utüity in starting the development. Much
the .best way to aid this development is simply more empirical work.
Sterzl, Anton, Der Untergang Roms an Rhein und Mosel, Köln 1978; also Ternes, Charles-
Marie, La vie quotidienne en Rhenanie Romaine (ler_rvieme siecie), Paris 1972.
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